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“Uncertainty and Urban Life” 
Forthcoming in Public Culture 
 Austin Zeiderman, Sobia Ahmad Kaker, Jonathan Silver, Astrid Wood 
 
Octavia is a city formed in the imagination of Cuban-born writer Italo Calvino (1974:75). 
It is a “spider-web city” hanging over a void between a pair of steep mountains, “bound to the 
two crests with ropes and chains and catwalks.” Getting from place to place requires great skill 
for there’s nothing but clouds below for hundreds of feet until you hit the valley floor: “You 
walk on the little wooden ties, careful not to set your foot in the open spaces, or you cling to the 
hempen strands.” The entire city is sustained by a mere “net which serves as passage and as 
support.” Rather than rising up from this foundation, everything else dangles beneath: “rope 
ladders, hammocks, houses made like sacks, clothes hangers, terraces like gondolas, skins of 
water, gas jets, spits, baskets on strings, dumb-waiters, showers, trapezes and rings for children’s 
games, cable cars, chandeliers, pots with trailing plants.” What could be more precarious, more 
uncertain, than such a city, where systems of sustenance and livelihood hang by a thread and the 
simplest journey might send one plummeting into the void? But here’s the twist: “Suspended 
over the abyss, the life of Octavia’s inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities.” How could 
it possibly be so? Because Octavians are aware of that which elsewhere remains concealed. The 
essay concludes: “They know the net will last only so long.” 
Calvino’s Octavia prompts us to consider uncertainty as an important dimension of urban 
life. In some respects, this has long preoccupied attempts to plan, build, and govern cities. 
Architects and urbanists of a modernist persuasion have often sought antidotes to that which 
cannot be known or managed: the “model” incarnates a vision of future possibility; the “zone” 
separates areas with ambiguous boundaries; the “census” enables calculations on which to base 
interventions; the “plan” offers an authoritative promise of the city to come. However, 
uncertainty has not only been a problem for professional urbanists but also for inhabitants of 
cities. Early theorists of the modern urban experience were deeply concerned about the social 
and psychological effects of city life. In opposition to what they assumed to be the regular, 
stable, and familiar routines of rural existence, the city was defined as a fundamentally 
unknowable and unpredictable environment. What Georg Simmel (1969) called the “mental life 
of the metropolis” was a response to the frenetic tempo, the unbounded multiplicity, and the 
infinite complexity of the modern city. If one responded to all external stimuli, he worried, “one 
would be atomized internally and come to an unimaginable psychic state” (1969:53). An attitude 
of impersonality, anonymity, and indifference was thought to be a defense against the 
fundamental uncertainty of modern metropolitan life. This duality in the legacy of urbanism—
uncertainty as a feature of urban life, uncertainty as a target of urban intervention—leads us to 
investigate both situated experiences of uncertainty and attempts to mitigate and manage it. 
 Though the problem of uncertainty has its place in the history of urbanism, it has taken 
on new urgency of late. Urbanization, Neil Brenner observes, “has become one of the dominant 
metanarratives through which our current planetary situation is interpreted, both in academic 
circles and in the public sphere” (2013:85). Yet there is disagreement at the most basic level over 
how to describe the global urban condition and how best to analyze and interpret it (McFarlane 
2011a; Brenner, Madden, and Wachsmuth 2011). As received paradigms of urban theory have 
come into question, there is a proliferation of analytical frameworks competing for dominance 
(Jacobs 2011; MacLeod and Jones 2011; Roy 2005; 2009b). If there is any consensus about 
twenty-first-century cities, it is around the impossibility of predicting what they will become. A 
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parallel situation exists in the realm of urban politics, policy, and practice. Beyond the 
perfunctory projection that “the future is urban,” there is no shared vision of how this future will 
unfold. As visions of urban futurity cede ground to tentative experiments in managing what 
cannot be confidently foreseen, governments and populations alike must orient themselves 
toward the unknown (Walker and Cooper 2011; Lakoff 2007). The currency of concepts like 
“preparedness,” “resilience,” and “sustainability” reflects an acceptance of future uncertainty as 
increasingly fundamental to contemporary urbanism (Amin 2013). With the widespread notion 
that we now live in turbulent times—economically, politically, and ecologically—uncertainty 
seems poised to be a defining feature and focus of urban theory and practice. 
Whether present futures are objectively more uncertain than futures past is beyond the 
scope of this essay. Though we are inspired by those who have examined temporal 
transformations on a grand scale (Bauman 2006; Beck 2009; Luhmann 2005), we prefer to 
remain agnostic about such world-historical questions and to resist the temptation to naturalize 
uncertainty as an essential characteristic of urban life today. We nevertheless wish to respond to 
the theoretical and practical problem of uncertainty by placing it at the center of our frame of 
critical inquiry. In doing so, we draw upon a rich body of work across the social sciences. 
Science and technology studies teach us that uncertainty is a domain of knowledge and non-
knowledge that generates controversies of authority and expertise (Callon, Lascoumes, and 
Barthe 2009) and “creates a demand for solutions to the ambiguity it perpetuates” (McGoey 
2009:155). Governmentality studies direct us to the discourses and practices through which 
uncertainty is problematized and governed, and to how urban life is governed through 
uncertainty (Samimian-Darash 2013; O’Malley 2004). Studies of financial markets present us 
with a domain beyond the state in which uncertainty is productive and can be capitalized upon, 
through speculation and hedging (Zaloom 2004; LiPuma and Lee 2004). Urban studies draw our 
attention to how city dwellers in much of the world experience uncertainty as both an obstacle 
and an opportunity (Simone 2010; De Boeck 2011). Recognizing the pitfalls of shifting between 
these diverse perspectives on uncertainty—that it may be too much for one term to bear—we 
seek not to bring them together in a unified theory. We wish to exploit the polysemic nature of 
the concept in order to open up a complex field of analysis and bring together styles of thought 
usually kept separate. 
In what follows, we present four cases that use uncertainty as a lens through which to 
examine the urban.1 Although all the cases emphasize those aspects of cities and urban life that 
cannot be confidently known, anticipated, or managed, each focuses on a different dimension of 
uncertainty, locates it in a different city, and mobilizes different conceptual tools for making it 
visible. In Karachi, Pakistan, Kaker focuses on a securitized housing complex run by the military 
that promises to reduce the uncertainties of everyday life in a violent, conflict-ridden city. In 
Accra, Ghana, Silver concentrates on crises within the energy networks that supply the city, and 
how people respond to persistent infrastructural uncertainty. In Bogotá, Colombia, Zeiderman 
highlights the multiple levels on which the uncertain future saturates the present by focusing on 
                                                
1 This collaborative project has been undertaken both collectively and individually. The conceptual framing emerged 
from a conversation about common threads running through our respective cases, after which we agreed that 
uncertainty was a way to describe our shared observations. The introduction was written by the first author in 
consultation with the other three. The collaborative endeavor began after all authors had concluded extensive field 
research in their respective sites. Yet data collected individually was re-analyzed collectively with a fresh eye. The 
empirical sections were written individually with feedback from other authors. The conclusion emerged from 
collective identification of cross-cutting themes. It was written primarily by the first author with substantive input 
from the other three. 
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efforts to govern potential threats in the informal settlements of the urban periphery. In 
Johannesburg, South Africa, Wood analyzes investment in transportation projects that promise 
universal applicability and predictable results as a response to uncertainty about the future of the 
post-apartheid city. 
Our interest in uncertainty is inseparable from the locations in which we work. Karachi, 
Accra, Bogotá, and Johannesburg—like many cities of the global South—have long been 
understood as places that repeatedly frustrate the desire for certainty inherent to modernist urban 
planning, governance, and development (Chakrabarty 2002; Edensor and Jayne 2011). They 
have typically been seen to lack the laws, institutions, statistics, and boundaries on which to base 
rational, technical solutions to persistent urban problems. Because chaos, inconstancy, and 
unpredictability are often associated with urbanism in the global South, it would be easy to read 
our argument about the centrality of uncertainty to contemporary urban life as peculiar to these 
cities. This might tempt us to treat uncertainty as a synonym for poverty, informality, or disorder. 
Instead, we argue that while the dynamics we discuss may be less evident in the global North, 
they nevertheless confound the categorical divides of First and Third Worlds, global cities and 
megacities, modernity and development (Robinson 2006). Inverting the conventional trajectory 
of urban theory, which is often based on the cities of the North and then “applied” to the rest of 
the world (Roy 2009a), we ask what an examination of urban uncertainty in the cities of the 
South can tell us about contemporary urbanism at large. 
Our initial conversations revealed parallels as well as disjunctures across our respective 
field sites. This suggested the need to avoid treating the “urban” as a distinct and bounded spatial 
type with common characteristics. Our comparative approach allowed us to remain grounded in 
the particular context of each city and to let each case illuminate different dimensions of our 
overarching concern (Robinson 2011). We chose not to apply a single conceptual framework to 
the four cases but to base our inquiry on a set of common questions: What uncertainties are in 
evidence throughout each city and how are they materialized in urban space? How is uncertainty 
produced, what work is it doing, and at what scale? What projects, both personal and political, 
does uncertainty enable or constrain and what responses is it generating? How is uncertainty 
lived, negotiated, and mobilized by differently positioned urban actors and what additional 
uncertainties are emerging as a result? 
Together, these questions point to uncertainty as something that is both produced and 
productive—what we might call a dialectic of uncertainty in order to emphasize its dynamic, 
processual, and recursive nature. This is the main commonality across our four cases. 
Historically sedimented conditions of uncertainty lead to strategic attempts by distinctly located 
and unequally positioned urban actors to stabilize select elements of the urban milieu, which 
enables certain outcomes and constrains others while generating more uncertainties along the 
way. These uncertainties can never entirely be overcome, nor is overcoming uncertainty always 
the objective, since uncertainty can be advantageous for some and disadvantageous for others, a 
problem at one scale and a solution at another. While the following sections highlight the 
different ways in which this dynamic unfolds in specific locations, in conclusion we will return 
to additional parallels between our individual cases and to the task of transcending the 
particularity of each one. It bears restating that our ultimate goal is not to overcome the 
theoretical and practical uncertainties cited above, but rather to demonstrate the conceptual 
utility of analyzing uncertainty as a key dimension of the contemporary urban condition. We will 
now turn to the first of our empirical cases. 
 
DRAFT—please do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission. 
 4 
An Island of Order in Karachi  
Imagine living in a space administered by a non-democratic governing authority where 
permission to buy, sell, or rent property is based on background checks, conditions are imposed 
on free movement, entry is monitored and regulated by guards and CCTV cameras, and strict 
rules structure everyday life. This is the case of hundreds of willing residents of Askari III: a 
heavily securitized, walled, and gated housing complex for ex-military personnel and civilians in 
Karachi. They are drawn to such an authoritarian environment to counter uncertainties associated 
with everyday life in a city prone to outbursts of violence and infrastructural disruption. 
 For the twenty million residents of Karachi, the certainties of daily life hang in balance. 
Spontaneous breakdown and suspension of everyday provision of public goods such as water and 
electricity is common, caused by contests over jurisdiction amongst the numerous federal, 
provincial, and local governing agencies. A climate of fear also hangs over the city as residents 
frequently fall victim to kidnappings, robberies, and shootings in the absence of effective and 
responsive public policing. In many of Karachi’s neighborhoods, residents have responded by 
creating alternate systems to manage disturbances in everyday life and informal governance 
structures emerge to remedy everyday uncertainties of infrastructural disruption and insecurity. 
These may be resident committees and community associations or armed gangs and local 
militias. The residential enclaves they form are politically charged spaces that are often 
patronized by political bosses, and hence become embroiled in Karachi’s volatile vote politics. 
The number of favors bestowed to improve public services in a given area are usually predicated 
on its strategic political significance as an electorate, as well as the power wielded by the patron 
over local and national politics. 
These processes are taking place all across the city. Karachi has morphed into an 
archipelago of enclaves, and enclavization has become a strategy to manage everyday life with 
minimal disruption. Enclaves exist in both planned and unplanned areas of the city and differ 
according to physical features, circulation patterns, and social demographics. However, all are 
privately securitized, exclusionary spatial communities governed through distinct juridico-
political structures. Those living inside are subjected to a high degree of social control, and in 
this sense enclaves may be understood as a spatial manifestation of civic governmentality 
(Robins 2002; Roy 2009b). Ethnographic research in Karachi shows enclaves to be relational and 
dynamic spaces borne out of multi-scalar political alliances and negotiations. This makes 
enclaved spaces necessarily fluid, as their boundaries shift to include and exclude people based 
on the negotiated outcomes. Thus, enclavization exemplifies the productive capacity of urban 
uncertainty. It mobilizes what AbdouMaliq Simone refers to as anticipatory urban politics, or 
“the art of staying one step ahead of what might come, of being prepared to make a move” 
(2010:62). The myriad actors working to manage uncertainty through alliances, coalitions, and 
associations amongst and between formal and informal governance institutions constantly shift 
position in order to pursue more satisfying outcomes (Simone and Rao 2012), especially to enlist 
allies who can help to manage crisis (Appadurai 2002). However, such process are political in 
nature and wrought with tensions and conflict (Budhani et al. 2010), thus making uncertainty a 
constant feature of everyday urban life in Karachi. 
Askari III is one of many such enclaves in Karachi. It is settled on land which falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Karachi Cantonment Board (KCB), a remnant of colonial administration 
originally established to create a residential space to incorporate civilians ancillary to the British 
military. Rooted in the French word canton, cantonment refers to “a small part or a political 
division of the country” (Onions 1966:142). This is an apt definition of the political space of 
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Askari III: a space of exception suspended from the sovereign authority of the democratically 
elected City District Government of Karachi (CDGK). The Cantonment Board is exempt from 
the legal building codes and by-laws which regulate the areas under the jurisdiction of CDGK, 
and has independent responsibility over infrastructure provision, municipal functions, and land 
development. Cantonment areas are also heavily securitized. Circulation of outsiders is 
restricted, and the area is policed by both public and private security forces. Despite this physical 
and politico-legal separation, there is a material interconnection between the two governing 
bodies. The cantonment’s infrastructure is connected to the CDGK’s technical systems beyond 
the enclave. This makes the enclave an exceptional space that is both separate from and 
dependent on the wider city. 
Residents of Askari III express frustration towards the restrictive regulatory environment 
within which they live, but feel that it offers them security and stability impossible outside its 
walls. As one resident puts it: “I just don’t like this kind of life, but what do you do?…Last 
week, one political leader said something to another and that was it. No one could step out 
anymore because there was chaos in the streets. The kids just slept most of the day but in the 
evening I thought, thank God, at least I can go out and take a walk!” Yet living in a city where 
the Taliban regularly attacks state-military structures, residents also paradoxically feel more 
insecure living in Askari III: “We are all potential targets for terrorists—especially living in 
Askari…but we also know what the situation of the city is.” For residents, the uncertainties 
associated with everyday violence and infrastructure disruption in Karachi are less tolerable than 
the threat of a terrorist attack, which they view as an exceptional event. The paradox of security 
and insecurity is overruled by the expectation of certainty in everyday life which extends beyond 
safety to include public amenities. Askari III promises to be a secure island of order in a city 
characterized by disorder. Preferential legal agreements between the Cantonment Boards and 
public utility companies grant Askari III residents extraordinary rights over water, gas, and 
electricity provision. The agreement promises uninterrupted provision of utilities at subsidized 
rates, prioritizing cantonment areas at the cost of other areas. The legal framework has been 
shaped by successive military dictatorships to favor military enterprises. 
The relationship between residents of Askari III and the state, and their desire to live in a 
military compound, are both indicative of the political history of Pakistan. Sana’s sentiments are 
echoed by many of her neighbors in Askari III: “The police are a source of insecurity rather than 
security, the government is extremely corrupt—current events have completely lifted my trust 
off from these institutions. The only time the government runs properly is when it is under the 
Army’s baton!” In the 66 years since independence, the military has ruled the country for more 
than 30 years. In this period, it has consolidated as an organization of major geo-strategic and 
geo-economic value (Siddiqa 2007). The Army is trusted to deliver prosperity and security due 
to its historical success as an institution. A democratic government is seen as messy: political 
negotiations between coalition parties result in perpetual uncertainty over who holds power. 
Civil conflict often ensues, and the government loses credibility and legitimacy. This impacts 
systems of governance at the municipal level, and results in infrastructure disruption, economic 
decline, and urban insecurity. Askari III residents remember military rule fondly as a time of 
predictability, security, and prosperity. Despite suspending the rule of law and declaring a state 
of emergency during its reign, the military is trusted to deliver a sense of stability to everyday 
life.  
Although enclavization offers a semblance of certainty and security, it creates relational 
conditions of uncertainty and insecurity in the rest of the city. By altering the relationship 
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between citizens and the state, enclaves such as Askari III upset the delicate political balance in 
Karachi. Exclusive rights over urban infrastructure and public utilities coupled with increased 
security inside the enclave displace costs, shortages, and disruptions on those living outside. In 
turn, neighborhoods outside cantonment areas also resort to enclavization as a strategy to 
respond to these urban crises, and urban fragmentation multiplies. In other areas, resident 
associations emerge as powerful non-state actors who weaken the legitimacy of the government 
by mediating between citizens and public agencies. As traditional urban governance structures 
are twisted, residential enclaves materialize as spaces that have potential to restructure urban 
power and politics. Enclavization is therefore a self-perpetuating phenomenon linked with urban 
conflict and crisis. Consequently, the conditions of certainty promised by enclaves such as 
Askari III generate further uncertainty beyond their borders. 
 
Navigating uneven energy disruption in Accra 
 The cascade across the electricity system is visible from afar as I approach Ga Mashie, a 
poor neighborhood in central Accra. A light goes out in one household and then another quicker 
than can be followed. The music from a bar ceases and bright alleys plunge into darkness as the 
agency of the municipal power network asserts itself over the area (Bennett 2005). This is the 
third time this week that the neighborhood’s electricity supply has been disrupted. Such failures 
reflect a periodic crisis in those parts of the city without access to the spluttering generators that 
hum ubiquitously in middle-class areas. In Ga Mashie, the temporality of disruption is stochastic 
and recurrent, the flow of electricity never guaranteed. Residents maneuver around shifting 
infrastructure conditions to navigate the uncertainties of everyday life. 
 These electricity disruptions are produced through a multi-scalar crisis in energy 
production caused by ongoing generation problems at Akosomobo Dam. The energy crisis in 
Accra can be understood as a metabolic process (Gandy 2004; Keil 2005; Swyngedouw 2004) 
involving flows of capital, increasingly arid conditions in the Sahel, their impact on water flows 
across the Volta Water Basin, and the reduced flow of water into this hydro-electric facility. At 
other times, poverty is what affects households’ ability to sustain electricity supply. The 
installation of new pre-payment technologies compounds energy deprivation as low-income 
residents are often unable to afford paying in advance for this most vital of urban services. 
 Multi-scalar metabolic processes and more immediate causes of disruption produce an 
inability to anticipate the flow of electricity in the neighborhood. In Ga Mashie, conditions of 
disrepair and inaccessibility characterize the everyday energy geographies of the neighborhood. 
Gone are promises of a better future through networked services—the (Afro) modernist 
infrastructural ideal (Graham and Marvin 2001) around which Ghana’s first president, Kwame 
Nkrumah, sought to unite the newly independent nation. Despite architectural and infrastructural 
remainders from this more confident era, many of Accra’s residents are left with the legacy of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, under-invested infrastructure, and wider 
conditions of poverty. Yet people do not simply cope with the city’s unpredictable energyscape. 
They find ways to incrementally navigate it by seeking collaborative possibilities at various 
intersections across and beyond the energy infrastructure system. 
 A drift around the neighborhood reveals the multiple intersections between people and 
infrastructure in Accra’s low-income, networked neighborhoods. Hawkers sell fuel for lamps to 
use during network disruption, creating new ways to earn a few cedis (Ghana’s currency). Boys 
transform firewood into charcoal, providing material for cooking and generating some cedis for 
pre-paid electricity credit. Electricians keep meter readings low so households can sustain light 
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in the evening for children’s homework. A woman provides a charging point for mobile phones, 
which are vital in navigating the uncertainty around the next corner. A man tinkers with a broken 
transistor radio that used to provide news of network disruption, warning residents of the next 
load-shedding event. Others come together to hook up a new shack to a light source giving a 
sense of security and belonging to recent settlers. Elsewhere the Electricity Company of Ghana 
(ECG) office closes because the woman who staffs the counter is ill, generating considerable 
disruption for the rest of the day. Local residents must then put off their electricity credit 
purchase or travel to the next payment office twenty minutes away. These patterns may be 
similar the next day, but the dialectical urbanism will be in flux again (Simone 2004a) as 
residents incrementally find new ways to inhabit the city (De Boeck 2011). 
 While conditions of uncertainty can produce conflict, collaboration is the norm. Temporary 
intersections of interests around sustaining the energy infrastructures of the area combine to 
navigate network disruption, energy deprivation, and the daily task of getting by and getting on 
(Simone 2004b). As such, the installation of a new street light is financed by a local bar in 
anticipation of increased revenues, and an electrician with a newly opened charging point 
undertakes the labor without cost. Two young men from the opposite compound are sent to fetch 
wiring, content that the street light will provide their household with free evening light. Finally, 
the head of the local ECG office waves away concerns about the status of the street light, 
understanding its importance in generating income and knowing that he will receive a beer or 
two later in the week. At these intersections of people and infrastructure—what Simone (2004b) 
terms “people as infrastructure”—collaborative processes of urban learning (McFarlane 2011b) 
allow residents to actively reshape the network and to incrementally improve, test, and 
experiment with ways to address conditions of energy poverty and the uncertainties of daily life 
across the grid. The peripheral nature of urban life for many residents in Ga Mashie makes them 
vulnerable to multi-scalar crisis and energy deprivation but it also produces conditions of 
possibility (Loftus 2012) and new geographies of the city yet to come (Simone 2004a). As Filip 
De Boeck notes in Kinshasa, this form of urbanism “offers [the urban dweller] a considerable 
freedom to capture the sudden possibilities opened up by unexpected occasions that are 
generated by the synergies and frictions of urban life” (2011:272).  
 The geography of disruption and failure across the energy infrastructures of Accra reveals 
more than everyday responses of the urban poor to such dynamics; it also highlights the ongoing, 
although changing conditions of splintered urbanism (Graham and Marvin 2001) in the city. 
Thus, the energy crisis and associated insecurities generate a range of different but connected 
responses in other areas, demonstrating how uncertainty is problematized, capitalized, and 
reshaped through relationships of class, power, and access. As in Karachi, a boom in middle-
class urbanization is increasingly visible across the city’s landscape. In Accra, energy-intensive 
concrete suburbias are implicated in the production of crisis as soaring demand puts further stress 
on the electricity system while these households use generator technologies to insulate 
themselves from the implications of the urbanization of energy demand. Furthermore, frequent 
disruption and crisis across the city’s energy infrastructure creates new opportunities for capital 
accumulation. Global equity companies and other real estate investors seek financial returns by 
selling infrastructural security (Grant 2009). One outcome is the growth of post-networked 
urbanism and premium network spaces (Coutard and Rutherford 2011). This is increasingly 
visible as newly built neighborhoods offer life without disruption through off-grid generation or 
new technologies such as solar panels. These new energyscapes may lower demand, but they 
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also inhibit future investment in the public network, create further divisions across infrastructure, 
and mediate the uneven distribution of (energy) insecurity.  
 The multiple ways in which network disruption is produced, managed, and negotiated 
across and beyond the energy network provide insight into broader dynamics in Accra. As Colin 
McFarlane and Jonathan Rutherford argue, “the politics underpinning urban infrastructural 
transformation are rarely more evident or visible than in times of crisis or rupture” (2008:368). 
Understanding the distribution of uncertainty across Accra reveals the political nature of urban 
infrastructure and the role it plays in mediating social life. 
 
Zones of uncertainty in Bogotá 
A massive landslide marked the beginning of the end for Nueva Esperanza, a settlement 
built by rural migrants and refugees on the steep hillsides of Bogotá’s urban periphery. Before 
the catastrophe, settlers had gotten used to negotiating uncertainty on a number of levels. The 
streets had been controlled by autodefensas (paramilitary groups) known for conducting 
limpiezas (social cleansings) to rid the neighborhood of those they deemed desechable 
(disposable). Death threats were leveled at families who refused to collaborate or pay for 
protection. There were open-air drug markets, addicts robbing houses to support their habits, and 
shootouts between rival gangs competing for territory. As Joaquín, a former resident, told me: 
“That’s how one lived in Nueva Esperanza; always fighting to survive.” But daily life in Nueva 
Esperanza also involved a perpetual struggle with the material conditions of the settlement. 
Tubes carrying pirated water often burst, the leaks then saturating and destabilizing the ground. 
Wooden posts holding up roofs would rot and occasionally fall down. The only way to dispose 
of wastewater was to dump it into the open stream bordered by houses on either side. People 
frequently got sick during downpours rains as contaminated water flooded their homes. When a 
hillside finally collapsed, taking one-hundred and twenty-nine houses with it, the municipal 
government declared a state of emergency and the process of evacuating the neighborhood 
began. 
Similar stories are found throughout the urban periphery, where threats of crime and 
violence intermingle with hazards like landslide and flood. Bogotá’s highly uneven landscape of 
insecurity, both human and environmental, is the product of twentieth-century urban 
development patterns. Between 1950 and 2000, the population exploded from just over 700,000 
to about seven million, and much of this growth took place in informal settlements on the 
mountainous urban periphery. Peasants from the countryside arrived in the capital city, either 
seeking economic opportunity or fleeing violence. Upon arrival, they settled in centrally located 
inquilinatos (tenement housing), but as exiting options dwindled they gravitated to the hillsides 
of the city’s southern periphery. Urbanizadores piratas (pirate urbanizers) began to appropriate 
territories previously exploited for construction materials, subdividing them into small plots and 
selling them without legal title. The state had neither the interest nor the ability to regulate the 
urbanization of the periphery; in fact, political parties often facilitated ad-hoc urbanization in 
exchange for popular support. Settlers built their own dwellings using rudimentary construction 
materials on what was already precarious terrain. Conditions of compounded precarity are, as 
Mike Davis puts it, “poverty’s niche in the ecology of the city” (2006:121-22). For the many 
living in settlements like Nueva Esperanza, anticipating potential threats has become a 
normalized routine of daily life. 
Managing future uncertainty is not only an urgent problem for the urban poor in Bogotá, 
but also for the state. Since the late 1980s, the municipal government has been experimenting 
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with techniques for securing the city against a range of potential threats. In 1989, the Colombian 
legislature enacted a broad reform of urban government, which obligated municipalities with 
over 100,000 inhabitants to create inventories of “zones of high risk” for environmental hazards 
and begin mitigation work or relocation programs in these areas. In 1994, Bogotá’s mayor, Jaime 
Castro, directed what was then the Office of Emergency Prevention and Response to analyze the 
distribution of disaster risk across the city. The municipal housing agency (the Caja de la 
Vivienda Popular) was later put in charge of a resettlement program for families living in high-
risk zones, the majority of which were located in peripheral hillside settlements like Nueva 
Esperanza. In the mid-1990s, the imperative to secure Bogotá against potential threats extended 
beyond the domain of environmental hazards when Antanas Mockus was elected mayor in the 
wake of a barrage of homicides, political assassinations, crime waves, and bomb attacks. 
Searching for innovative strategies to confront rampant insecurity, Mockus found inspiration in 
Cali, Colombia’s third largest city, where the city government was approaching outbreaks of 
crime and violence as if they were emerging infectious diseases. Based on this model, Mockus 
set up a system for analyzing existing crime data in order to identify risk factors that could be 
used to predict when and where future violence would be likely to occur. Uniting these distinct if 
overlapping approaches to governing Bogotá was the problematization of the city as a security 
concern—as a space of risk. Over the past two decades, multiple techniques have been devised 
with which to govern (and govern through) uncertainty. 
Once brought into novel governmental frameworks, the precarious conditions of the 
urban periphery could become politically and economically productive. In the case of housing, 
the technical rationality of risk management led the state to limit its responsibility for providing 
shelter to the urban poor. The constitutional right to vivienda digna (decent housing) shared by 
all citizens only applied to populations deemed highly vulnerable to environmental hazards. 
Nevertheless, the declaration of “zones of high risk” thrust thousands of settlers on the urban 
periphery, previously marginal to formal economic and legal institutions, onto privatized markets 
for housing, credit, and utilities. Since resettlement was ostensibly voluntary, however, the 
government had to educate members of this population to become rational, responsible, and 
prudent; that is, to desire and actualize their own relocation. In the process, they could become 
homeowners, debtholders, and consumers. Through the technique of risk management, the 
imperative to govern uncertainty facilitated recognizably neoliberal forms of capital 
accumulation, institutional reform, and subject formation. Although their profitability pales in 
comparison, these efforts to render uncertainty productive are analogous to financial instruments, 
such as derivatives, created to commodify contingency (Cooper 2010; LiPuma and Lee 2004). 
Here and in the case of Accra we find evidence of what De Boeck sees as the parallel 
relationship between precarity and profitability in an urban context: “Daily life in Kinshasa is 
constantly punctuated by uncertainty, risk, provisionality, and the continuous hedging of bets, 
and these qualities also form the city’s main asset, and generate its main financial opportunities, 
precisely because both city and capital share the same fundamental characteristics” (2011:279). 
However, future uncertainty does not always works in the interest of political and 
economic elites or necessarily produce a post-political society ruled by technocratic experts 
(Swyngedouw 2010). The uncertain future can also be a terrain of political engagement on which 
people in the margins of the city pursue a better future. For example, in Bogotá, the 
governmental imperative to protect citizens against environmental hazards entitles vulnerable 
populations to housing subsidies. Some view this as an illegitimate exercise of state power or see 
it as too incremental to make a difference. But many recognize that their ability to demand state 
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beneficence—to some degree, their very status as legitimate political subjects—is predicated on 
the degree to which their lives are in danger. Since probabilistic calculations of risk and 
vulnerability are contingent and changeable, they are continually negotiated by government 
technicians and the inhabitants of high-risk zones. As such, those outside the designated 
boundaries of these zones regularly petition the municipal government to recognize that they, 
too, are vulnerable to environmental hazards. It is often by making themselves visible, 
individually and collectively, as lives at risk that the urban poor engage in political relationships 
with the state (Chatterjee 2004). When security is the orienting telos of government—that is, the 
political rationality shaping the state’s authority over and responsibility to its subjects—future 
uncertainty becomes the ground on which the urban poor struggle for political inclusion, 
recognition, and entitlement. Simone and Rao identify a similar political dynamic: “If no actor at 
any level can get a real handle on where [the city] is going, then an urban politics must try to eke 
out productivity from the prolific spaces of uncertainty” (2012:331). It is under these conditions, 
they argue, that a “constantly mutating majority” attempts “to secure for themselves the ongoing 
possibility to carve out a viable life” (2012:316). 
In Bogotá, uncertainty is not simply an experiential reality of the urban poor, a problem 
for government to manage, an economic opportunity to be pursued, or a terrain of popular 
political engagement. It is all of them at once. Uncertain futures saturate the present, enabling 
and disabling a range of actions and reactions from the state and from the urban population at 
large. 
 
Uncertain Transport Futures in Johannesburg 
In January 2013, the City of Johannesburg, formal bus companies, and informal minibus 
taxi operators signed an agreement to jointly manage the second phase of Johannesburg’s Rea 
Vaya bus rapid transit (BRT) system. BRT is a mode of urban public transport that combines the 
high-quality and speed of a rail system with the affordability and flexibility of a bus network. It 
was first proposed in Johannesburg in July 2006 and, just three years later, Rea Vaya Phase 1A 
became the first full feature BRT on the African continent, promising to inaugurate a new era in 
South African public transport. Now six years after BRT was initially adopted in Johannesburg, 
there is still only one 25.5-kilometer route moving just forty-five thousand persons each 
weekday. This delayed implementation can be partly attributed to prolonged disagreement 
among the paratransit operators who have customarily provided transport along the 18.5-
kilometer route between the former township of Soweto and the central business district.  
The story of BRT in Johannesburg reflects the spatio-political challenges faced by the 
transport sector in the post-apartheid city. For the most part, the urban poor rely on a politically 
powerful and under-regulated fleet of overcrowded, poorly maintained minibus taxis that operate 
irregular services. Taxi riders are often stranded at street corners waiting for the elusive white 
van whose unpredictable arrival introduces new dangers in their so-called “coffins-on-wheels.” 
BRT was adopted to provide safe, affordable, and reliable transport services to all Joburgers, in 
particular the working poor, while simultaneously formalizing the obstreperous taxi industry. Its 
larger purpose was to address the city’s historical spatial divide along racial lines and post-
apartheid splintering urbanism. Rehana Moosajee, Member of Mayoral Committee for Transport 
in Johannesburg sees BRT as a means to restore dignity to the residents of Johannesburg: “part 
of the problem with the taxis…is that people are treated like sardines…We always tried to see 
the bigger picture, that of respecting the dignity of commuters and of a transformed public 
transport system.”  
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Uncertainty now hangs over a project that was once seemingly infallible. Johannesburg’s 
Rea Vaya was modeled after the achievements of BRT in Bogotá (Colombia) and Curitiba 
(Brazil) and Phase 1A opened just sixteen months after political leaders and technical experts 
learned of it. Based on its success elsewhere, Johannesburg officials anticipated high ridership on 
an unsubsidized system operated by incorporating existing paratransit operators. However, BRT 
rollout has slowed as both bus and taxi operators remain hesitant to relinquish their control over 
the transport sector. A former representative of the taxi industry and now a senior manager of 
PioTrans, the operating company for Rea Vaya Phase 1A, underscores his initial apprehension 
about formalizing the taxi industry with reluctance to act alongside government officials and the 
threat of violence by other operators. Meanwhile, a senior director of Putco, the largest bus 
company in Gauteng Province, attributes his hesitation to competition between paratransit 
operators for passengers and revenue. These concerns resonate with the frequent assurances by 
city officials and from international proponents of BRT that it would be both viable and socially 
just while simultaneously reflecting Johannesburg’s motto: “A World Class African City.”  
Johannesburg is a sprawling city of automobile congestion, broken “robots” (traffic 
lights), and aggressive taxis cutting across four lanes and then stopping suddenly to load 
passengers before zooming off. Built atop of a maze of underground gold mining shafts, the city 
cannot support an underground transport network. Urban expansion was initially hastened by at-
grade transport services: horse-drawn streetcars were introduced in 1891, electric trams operated 
from 1906 to 1961, and trolleybuses ran from 1936 to 1986. Since then, city officials and 
engineers have struggled to propose an alternative mass-transit solution. An informal minibus 
taxi industry emerged after deregulation in 1986 and subsequently expanded to dominate service 
routes between the townships and the city. When BRT arrived in 2006, the existing rail network 
was overwhelmed by passenger demand and its fixed lines were inadequate in the expanding 
metropolis. Bus systems were similarly incapable of matching the combination of extraordinary 
demand and low-density urban form. The nature of Johannesburg’s transport uncertainty has 
been prolonged. It did not irrupt through shocks of extraordinary events but was generated 
through the ordinary and persistent stresses of relying on deficient urban transport networks. The 
“potential uncertainty” (Samimian-Darash 2013) of the constantly-approaching-but-never-
arriving urban transport crisis explains the rapid adoption of BRT and the persistence of 
Johannesburg policy actors to resolve paratransit operators’ apprehension about the second 
phase.  
Weak and ineffective government strategies to reform public transport, formalize the taxi 
industry, and densify the city are amongst the major obstacles confronting post-apartheid 
urbanism in South Africa. Policy actors describe an almost doomsday scenario filled with 
anxiety and indecision, calling it a “commuter crisis” akin to the global financial crisis and 
explaining that something must be done to reform and improve mobility opportunities. These 
arguments are useful in understanding how problems, policies, and politics converged in 
Johannesburg to sanction BRT as the solution. BRT was introduced as a way to guarantee safe, 
predictable transportation for those accustomed to riding in minibus taxis. Since BRT was touted 
as a low-cost, high-capacity solution to the city’s urgent transport predicament, other solutions 
were not sufficiently investigated. Recall that prior to the adoption of BRT, transport officials 
were in the process of developing the Strategic Public Transport Network (SPTN), an attempt to 
manage informal transit services by creating comprehensive routes, timetables, and signage for 
users. In 2006 however, the SPTN was scrapped in favor of the grander BRT network. The 
policy mobilities literature (McCann and Ward 2011) is useful here for understanding the 
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process by which BRT was adopted in Johannesburg because of its auspicious success 
elsewhere. The assurance of certainty is perhaps a vital precondition for investing in major 
infrastructure projects like BRT.  
BRT is a particularly impressive intervention in Johannesburg: the Rea Vaya bus follows 
a schedule; passengers pre-pay using cashless cards; and information is clearly posted at 
purpose-built glass and concrete stations. This vivid materiality suggests a sounder alternative, 
replacing the unpredictability of waiting at a street corner for an unreliable service. However, 
certainty is not always associated with the size and scope of a project. For instance, a previous 
attempt to manage the informal taxi industry addressed the taxis themselves and made no 
substantive improvements in the overall quality of public transport services. The national Taxi 
Recapitalization Program (TRP) was first announced in 1999 as a strategy to transform and 
regulate the minibus taxi industry by replacing old, tattered vans with modern, shiny vehicles. 
TRP introduced a material certainty by reducing the safety hazards commonly associated with 
the inadequately maintained vehicles. The program was for the most part a fruitless exercise—
unlicensed drivers still drove recklessly, selectively picking up passengers on impulse, and riders 
continued feeling unsafe for the duration of the journey. Accompanying the promises of 
certainty, major infrastructure projects also elevate suspicion and mistrust through the usual 
difficulties associated with implementation. McFarlane and Rutherford (2008) argue that 
infrastructure often becomes a site of negotiation, contestation, and struggle. Thus, materiality 
can reproduce uncertainty within its sureness.  
It is not surprising that the implementation of BRT is hardly straightforward given the 
transformative power it is imagined to have in the South African city. BRT promises to provide 
Joburgers with an affordable, reliable and safe transport system, taxi operators with formalized 
and stable employment, and buses with viable routes. It also conjures up images of equality and 
dignity for all Joburgers, moving freely and efficiently through urban space regardless of skin 
color or income, in a city free from the grip of informality, and instead managed by an efficient 
and capable municipal government. In spite of the delayed implementation of Rea Vaya’s second 
phase, BRT remains a harbinger of the post-apartheid urban future. 
 
Conclusion 
Our opening reference to Calvino’s Octavia prompted us to examine the role of 
uncertainty in contemporary cities. In the course of our analysis, however, this imaginary place 
became more than a suggestive provocation. It began to serve as a figurative depiction of the 
multiple levels on which uncertainty shapes the organization and inhabitation of cities. Calvino’s 
illustration of the precarious infrastructure supporting life in Octavia resonated with our analysis 
of vital systems (such as electricity, housing, and transport) whose form and function are far 
from stable. His image of a city held together by wooden ties and hempen strands, dangling over 
an abyss, approximated our focus on the materialization of uncertainty in urban space. His 
emphasis on everyday tasks, always undertaken with caution, resembled our attention to what 
people do when basic necessities and routine activities cannot be taken for granted. The fact that 
these conditions are in plain sight in Octavia pointed us to visibility as important to whether 
uncertainty can or cannot be negotiated. And Calvino’s paradoxical insight—that awareness of 
Octavia’s impermanence makes life less uncertain there than in other cities—mirrored our 
observations about the often contradictory outcome of quests for predictability, security, and 
certitude. 
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Octavia only takes us so far. Drawing our four cases together revealed a number of 
themes that are absent from the figurative city depicted by Calvino. Foremost among them was 
the observation that uncertainty crosses multiple levels and scales. It may be tempting to locate it 
solely within everyday struggles for survival among the urban poor. It is equally possible to see 
it as a problem limited to the techno-political domain of urban planning, development, and 
governance. Rather than focusing exclusively on any one level, we used uncertainty as a lens 
through which to examine the urban from a variety of perspectives. In Karachi, we focused on 
members of the urban middle class living in a heavily securitized residential compound 
administered by the military. In Accra, it is households in a poor but networked neighborhood 
who most strongly experience daily fluctuations in energy supply. In Johannesburg, it is the 
policymakers in charge of transportation infrastructure who seek answers to a future in question. 
In Bogotá, uncertain futures saturate the present on multiple levels at once. This perspective 
allows us to examine empirically the different orientations to uncertainty within each case and to 
connect analytically across cases. Although such a view is not always available to individual 
actors, neither is it the exclusive domain of the analyst. Our informants often highlighted 
multiple orientations to uncertainty within the same city; our task was to bring them together 
toward a broader understanding of how uncertainty shapes urban life. 
Yet uncertainty is not a generalized condition that is evenly distributed—on the contrary, 
all the cities in which we work are deeply divided and unequal. As a result, differently positioned 
and empowered urban actors with widely divergent resources and forms of capital mobilize 
different tactics and techniques in response to different forms of uncertainty. Set against the 
modernist ideal of a politically unified, socially equal, and infrastructurally cohesive city, these 
responses reflect conditions of social and spatial fragmentation. Although unequally spread 
according to hierarchies of power and privilege, uncertainty frequently crosses social and spatial 
divides, occasionally uniting actors around a common problem or in pursuit of similar objectives. 
Weaving these different dynamics together allowed us to demonstrate how uncertainty becomes 
an active force shaping the city and everyday life within it. 
All of our cases highlighted practices of seeking out, aspiring to, and searching for ways 
of dealing with the unpredictable and unstable dimensions of urban existence. Without 
presuming that certitude is an essential human need, we recognized the seductive power of the 
promise of a life free from the likelihood of blackouts, the threat of violence, the possibility of 
landslide and flood, or the unpredictability of democratic deliberation. However, even when 
solutions to uncertainty are found, there is rarely a final resolution or fixed point of closure. The 
situations we described are open-ended and uncertainty is rarely if ever eradicated from the 
urban milieu; rather it is managed, displaced, deferred, reconfigured, or reproduced. Recall the 
observation that uncertainty is processual and relational: strategies for reducing the likelihood of 
energy blackouts in one Accra neighborhood increase their likelihood in another; the relocation 
of slum dwellers in Bogotá to protect them from one kind of threat exposes them to other forms 
of vulnerability elsewhere; the creation of an enclave in Karachi destabilizes structures of 
governance in other parts of the city. Official and popular responses to uncertainty often attempt 
to create boundaries—spatial and temporal—around events, conditions, behaviors, objects, and 
groups. But bounding uncertainty is not the same as reducing or removing it. The phrase 
“governing through uncertainty” highlights that, in the domain of urban governance, techno-
political action is not necessarily paralyzed by that which cannot be calculated, predicted, or 
fixed. The same insight emerges from our approach to uncertainty as productive. In 
Johannesburg, uncertainties about how to provide public transport have a specific history but 
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they also play a role in shaping the conditions of possibility for the future. Uncertainty gives rise 
to novel urban configurations, transforming the conditions of possibility in the city while 
generating new forms of urban life and livelihood. 
There are at least two reasons why we should not romanticize the openness of uncertain 
urban futures. First, because we must not lose sight of the precarious conditions in which many 
city dwellers reside. True, the poor in Bogotá and Accra may relate to future uncertainty as a 
terrain of political possibility or as a field of creative collaboration. But unpredictable electricity 
supplies and heightened landslide risks also index material conditions of protracted poverty and 
entrenched marginality. Even in Karachi, where middle-class residents use their resources and 
connections to seek protection within the confines of a walled compound, fears and stresses 
continue to haunt their daily routines. Uncertainty enables some futures at the same time that it 
forecloses others. Second, the social and political openness of uncertainty has its economic twin, 
which usually results in material benefits for select groups. From investments in exclusive off-
grid suburban developments in Accra to taxi operators delaying the extension of the BRT system 
in Johannesburg, uncertainty produces opportunities for generating profit. Just as investment 
instruments like derivatives make it possible to capitalize on contingency, fluidity, and 
unpredictability in financial markets, other techniques for managing uncertainty in an urban 
context convert these conditions into forms of value that can be commodified and exchanged. In 
Bogotá, risk management programs aim to protect the lives of vulnerable citizens at the same 
time that they facilitate the creation and expansion of privatized markets for housing, credit, and 
services. By structuring flows of capital in and out of the urban environment, uncertainty 
produces economic opportunities and shapes geographies of investment and disinvestment across 
the city. Again, we see that urban uncertainty is not always a problem to be solved or a disorder 
to be corrected. 
Our final observation is about the degree to which uncertainty has recently become a 
feature and focus of urban theory and practice. On a theoretical level, universalist paradigms 
have been thoroughly unsettled and in their stead we find a range of analytical frameworks 
offering fragmentary perspectives on the urban. On a practical level, grand visions of urban 
futurity are disintegrating into tentative, localized experiments focused on eventualities to be 
avoided rather than pursued. This suggests that uncertainty has become internal to ways of 
analyzing and interpreting cities as well as to ideas of how to create the cities of tomorrow. We 
have not tried to resolve this theoretical and practical quandary by proposing a new urban theory 
or a new vision for what cities should aspire to become. Rather, we have placed uncertainty at 
the center of our frame of critical inquiry and examined its influence on how contemporary cities 
are planned, built, governed, and inhabited. If uncertainty is important, perhaps even increasingly 
so, to how the urban is imagined, organized, and lived, then the task of analyzing its analytical 
and political potential is now more urgent than ever. 
DRAFT—please do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission. 
 15 
References 
Amin, Ash. 2013. “Surviving the Turbulent Future.” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 31 (1): 140–156. 
Appadurai, Arjun. 2002. “Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of 
Politics.” Public Culture 14 (1): 21–47. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2006. Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Beck, Ulrich. 2009. World at Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bennett, Jane. 2005. “The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout.” Public 
Culture 17 (3): 445–466. 
Brenner, Neil. 2013. “Theses on Urbanization.” Public Culture 25 (1): 85–114. 
Brenner, Neil, David J. Madden, and David Wachsmuth. 2011. “Assemblage Urbanism and the 
Challenges of Critical Urban Theory.” City 15 (2): 225–240. 
Budhani, Azmat Ali, Haris Gazdar, Sobia Ahmad Kaker, and Hussain Bux Mallah. 2010. “The 
Open City: Social Networks and Violence in Karachi.” Crisis States Working Paper Series 
2. 
Callon, Michel, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe. 2009. Acting in an Uncertain World: An 
Essay on Technical Democracy. London: MIT Press. 
Calvino, Italo. 1974. Invisible Cities. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2002. “Of Garbage, Modernity, and the Citizen’s Gaze.” In Habitations of 
Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies, 65–79. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most 
of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Cooper, Melinda. 2010. “Turbulent Worlds: Financial Markets and Environmental Crisis.” 
Theory, Culture & Society 27 (2-3): 167–190. 
Coutard, Olivier, and Jonathan Rutherford. 2011. “Post-Networked Cities: Recombining 
Infrastructural, Ecological and Urban Transitions.” In Cities and Low Carbon Transitions, 
edited by Harriet Bulkeley, Vanesa Castán Broto, Mike Hodson, and Simon Marvin, 107–
125. London: Routledge. 
Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums. New York: Verso. 
DRAFT—please do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission. 
 16 
De Boeck, Filip. 2011. “Inhabiting Ocular Ground: Kinshasa’s Future in the Light of Congo's 
Spectral Urban Politics.” Cultural Anthropology 26 (2) (May 25): 263–286. 
Edensor, Tim, and Mark Jayne, ed. 2011. Urban Theory Beyond the West: A World of Cities. 
London: Routledge. 
Gandy, Matthew. 2004. “Rethinking Urban Metabolism: Water, Space and the Modern City.” 
City 8 (3): 363–379. 
Graham, Stephen, and Simon Marvin. 2001. Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, 
Technological Mobilites and the Urban Condition. London: Routledge. 
Grant, Richard. 2009. Globalizing City: The Urban and Economic Transformation of Accra, 
Ghana. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Jacobs, Jane M. 2011. “Urban Geographies I: Still Thinking Cities Relationally.” Progress in 
Human Geography 36 (3): 412–422. 
Keil, Roger. 2005. “Progress Report—Urban Political Ecology.” Urban Geography 26 (7): 640–
651. 
Lakoff, Andrew. 2007. “Preparing for the Next Emergency.” Public Culture 19 (2): 247–271. 
LiPuma, Edward, and Benjamin Lee. 2004. Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Loftus, Alex. 2012. Everyday Environmentalism: Creating an Urban Political Ecology. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Luhmann, Niklas. 2005. Risk: A Sociological Theory. New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction. 
MacLeod, Gordon, and Martin Jones. 2011. “Renewing Urban Politics.” Urban Studies 48 (12): 
2443–2472. 
McCann, Eugene, and Kevin Ward. 2011. Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the 
Global Age. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
McFarlane, Colin. 2011a. “Assemblage and Critical Urbanism.” City 15 (2): 204–224. 
———. 2011b. Learning the City: Knowledge and Translocal Assemblage. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
McFarlane, Colin, and Jonathan Rutherford. 2008. “Political Infrastructures: Governing and 
Experiencing the Fabric of the City.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 32 (2): 363–374. 
DRAFT—please do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission. 
 17 
McGoey, Linsey. 2009. “Pharmaceutical Controversies and the Performative Value of 
Uncertainty.” Science as Culture 18 (2): 151–164. 
O’Malley, Pat. 2004. Risk, Uncertainty and Government. London: The GlassHouse Press. 
Onions, C. T. 1966. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Robins, Steven. 2002. “At the Limits of Spatial Governmentality: A Message from the Tip of 
Africa.” Third World Quarterly 23 (4): 665–689. 
Robinson, Jennifer. 2006. Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2011. “Cities in a World of Cities: The Comparative Gesture.” International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 35 (1): 1–23. 
Roy, Ananya. 2005. “Urban Informality: Toward an Epistemology of Planning” 71 (2): 147–158. 
———. 2009a. “The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory.” Regional Studies 
43 (6): 819–830. 
———. 2009b. “Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai.” 
Antipode 41 (1): 159–179. 
Samimian-Darash, Limor. 2013. “Governing Future Potential Biothreats: Toward an 
Anthropology of Uncertainty.” Current Anthropology 54 (1): 1–22. 
Siddiqa, Ayesha. 2007. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Simmel, Georg. 1969. “The Metropolis and Mental Life.” In Classic Essays on the Culture of 
Cities, edited by Richard Sennett, 47–60. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2004a. For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
———. 2004b. “People as Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg.” Public 
Culture 16 (3): 407–429. 
———. 2010. City Life from Jakarta to Dakar: Movements at the Crossroads. London: 
Routledge. 
Simone, AbdouMaliq, and Vyjayanthi Rao. 2012. “Securing the Majority: Living through 
Uncertainty in Jakarta.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36 (2): 
315–335. 
DRAFT—please do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission. 
 18 
Swyngedouw, Erik. 2004. Social Power and the Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2010. “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate 
Change.” Theory, Culture & Society 27 (2-3): 213–232. 
Walker, Jeremy, and Melinda Cooper. 2011. “Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology 
to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation.” Security Dialogue 42 (2): 143–160. 
Zaloom, Caitlin. 2004. “The Productive Life of Risk.” Cultural Anthropology 19 (3): 365–391. 




This paper is the outcome of collaboration between researchers studying various aspects of urban 
governance (energy, disaster, security, and transport) across cities of the global South. The 
authors argue for the analytical utility of placing uncertainty at the center of discussions about 
how contemporary cities are planned, built, governed, and inhabited. This is demonstrated 
through case examples that examine uncertainty as something produced by historical conditions 
and productive of future possibilities. Each author offers a concise case study that examines a 
different dimension of uncertainty, locates it in a different city, and mobilizes different 
conceptual tools for making it intelligible. In Karachi, Kaker focuses on a securitized housing 
complex run by the military that promises to reduce the uncertainties of everyday life in a 
violent, conflict-ridden city. In Accra, Silver concentrates on crises within the energy networks 
that supply the city, and how people respond to persistent infrastructural uncertainty. In Bogotá, 
Zeiderman highlights the multiple levels on which the uncertain future saturates the present by 
focusing on efforts to govern potential threats in the informal settlements of the urban periphery. 
In Johannesburg, Wood analyzes investment in transportation projects that promise universal 
applicability and predictable results as a response to unpredictable transport services and 
uncertainty about the future of the post-apartheid city. The authors conclude by discussing 
parallels and disjunctures in how uncertainty shapes urban life in each city.  
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